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MICHAEL NIELSEN AND RUSH T. STEWART
Abstract. This essay has two aims. The first is to correct an increasingly popular way
to misunderstand Belot’s Orgulity Argument. The Orgulity Argument charges Bayesianism
with defect as a normative epistemology. For concreteness, our argument focuses on Cisewski
et al.’s recent rejoinder to Belot. The conditions that underwrite their version of the argu-
ment are too strong and Belot does not endorse them on our reading. A more compelling
version of the Orgulity Argument than Cisewski et al. present is available, however—a point
that we make by drawing an analogy with de Finetti’s argument against mandating count-
able additivity. Having presented the best version of the Orgulity Argument, our second aim
is to develop a reply to it. We extend Elga’s idea of appealing to finitely additive probability
to show that the challenge posed by the Orgulity Argument can be met.
Keywords. Finite additivity; orgulity; probability; topology; modesty
1. Introduction
How much confidence does rationality demand in one’s ability to get at the truth? A
natural thought is that it depends on the nature of the inquiry at hand. A certain amount
of humility might be understandable in the face of sufficiently complex problems. But, for
Bayesians, such humility is out of the question. Coherence compels Bayesians to always be
fully confident. Based on this fact, Gordon Belot advances an argument against Bayesian-
ism that we call the Orgulity Argument. The upshot of the Orgulity Argument is that
Bayesianism—one of the most compelling, popular, powerful, and principled epistemological
frameworks ever studied—is defective as a normative theory.
The argument has already proven to be influential and has produced a growing literature
(Huttegger, 2015a; Weatherson, 2015; Elga, 2016; Belot, 2017; Cisewski et al., 2018; Pomatto
and Sandroni, 2018). This literature raises several interesting and important points about
the foundations of Bayesian learning. But we have found that many contributors to this
literature have misread Belot and have failed to identify the best version of the Orgulity
Argument. This is important because, if we are correct, the challenge posed to Bayesianism
by the Orgulity Argument is not being addressed let alone met by most contributions to this
debate. In order for the debate to advance, it is necessary to correct these mistakes. That is
the first aim of this essay. Below, we focus on the most recent contribution to the debate from
Cisewski et al. (2018), though we indicate also how our argument applies to other readers of
Belot (Huttegger, 2015a; Weatherson, 2015; Pomatto and Sandroni, 2018).
We argue that Cisewski et al.’s version of the Orgulity Argument relies on two premises
that Belot does not endorse and, interpretative issues aside, are too strong to underwrite a
plausible challenge to Bayesianism. The main point is simple. There is a clear difference
between mandating certain behavior and insisting that the behavior be permissible. On
Cisewski et al.’s reading of the Orgulity Argument, a certain kind of epistemological modesty
(to be explained below) is rationally mandatory. On our reading, the argument relies on a
considerably weaker premise: such modesty is permissible.
Having articulated the correct way to understand the Orgulity Argument, the second
aim of our essay is to defend a line of response to the argument, initiated by Elga (2016),
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that involves relaxing countable additivity. This approach was initiated by Elga (2016) and
involves relaxing countable additivity. Here, the first part of the essay proves useful. The
tools that we develop for thinking about the correct version of the Orgulity Argument also
help us to see that criticisms of Elga’s reply are flawed. We then extend Elga’s argument,
showing that replies to the Orgulity Argument based on finitely additive probability theory
are surprisingly robust.
After introducing the framework and the relevant concepts for the debate in Section 2, we
present and discuss the Orgulity Argument as Cisewski et al. understand it (Section 3). By
our lights, their interpretation exemplifies a common way of misunderstanding Belots point.
We then present a better version of the Orgulity Argument and clarify the normative confu-
sion at stake by drawing an analogy to de Finetti’s argument against mandating countable
additivity (Sections 4 and 5). Finally, in Section 6, we develop the finitely additive approach
to answering the Orgulity Argument.
2. Preliminaries
All versions of the Orgulity Argument rely on the mathematical concepts that we introduce
in this section. Let C “ t0, 1uN be the set of all countably infinite binary sequences. We could
interpret C as the set of possible outcomes of an experiment in which a coin is tossed infinitely
many times, for example. In order to produce a probability space, we pair C with a particular
sigma-algebra of its subsets, which we denote B.1 Elements of B are called hypotheses or
events.
Bayesianism is the view that a rational agent’s state of uncertainty regarding some set
of live possibilities is represented by a probability measure.2 This probability measure is
subject to revision as the agent learns. In particular, agents learn by conditionalization,
forming posterior probabilities from prior conditional probabilities. The Orgulity Argument
is a critique of the epistemological significance often attributed to the Bayesian convergence-
to-the-truth theorem. To present the theorem, we introduce some more notation. Let P be
a probability measure on pC,Bq. If ω P C, let ωn be the set of sequences that agree with ω
up to the nth digit. If H is an event in B, let 1H be the indicator function for H.
3 The
convergence-to-the-truth theorem says that
P ptω : 1Hpωq “ lim
nÑ8 P pH|ω
nquq “ 1 (1)
for all hypotheses H.4 Suppose that ω is the actual sequence of 0s and 1s, and that this
sequence is to be revealed one bit at a time to an agent with personal probabilities given
by P . After observing the nth bit, the agent updates her probabilities by conditionalizing
on ωn. Then, (1) says that for any hypothesis H, the agent believes (with probability 1)
that her posterior probabilities for H will converge to 1 or 0 according to whether H is
true or false, respectively. For any hypothesis H, the agent believes that she will converge
1We endow C with the infinite product topology of discrete topologies on t0, 1u. The resulting topological
space is called Cantor space. B is the (Borel) sigma-algebra that is generated by the open subsets of Cantor
space.
2With Belot, we will assume for the moment that probabilities are countably additive. The probability P
satisfies countable additivity if, for any countable collection tAiuiPN of pairwise disjoint hypotheses in B, we
have P
`Ť8
i“1Ai
˘ “ ř8i“1 P pAiq. We return to countable additivity below.
31Hpωq “
#
1, ω P H
0, ω R H
4See, for example, Billingsley (2008, Theorem 35.6).
OBLIGATION, PERMISSION, AND BAYESIAN ORGULITY 3
to the truth about H. We call the complement of the set that appears in (1), namely
tω : 1Hpωq ‰ limnÑ8 P pH|ωnqu, the failure set for H (with respect to P ). If ω is in
the failure set for H, then conditionalizing on ωn will not lead P to the truth about H.
Another way of summarizing (1) is to say that, for any hypothesis H, a Bayesian agent
assigns probability 0 to the failure set for H.
The failure set for H is probabilistically “negligible” or “small” because it is assigned
probability 0. The Orgulity Argument appeals to a distinct notion of smallness that uses
topological concepts. A subset A of a topological space is nowhere dense if its closure has
empty interior, i.e. the smallest closed set containing A does not contain any open sets.
Nowhere dense sets are topologically small. For example, any finite subset of R is nowhere
dense in the standard topology. A set is called meager if it is the countable union of nowhere
dense sets.5 Since countable unions of probability 0 sets have probability 0, it makes sense
to say that countable unions of probabilistically small sets are probabilistically small. Sim-
ilarly, meager sets, like the nowhere dense sets that compose them, are often said to be
small or “atypical.” The complement of a meager set is a comeager (or residual) set and is
topologically “large” or “typical.”
We can now state the mathematical fact that is the driving force behind the Orgulity
Argument. Topological and probabilistic notions of smallness need not coincide. In particular,
there are probabilities P on pC,Bq and hypotheses H inB such that the failure set for H with
respect to P is comeager.6 But applying (1) to the failure set for H, we see that it is assigned
probability 0. Although the failure set for H is topologically large, it is probabilistically
small. An agent with personal probabilities given by P assigns probability 0 to failing to
converge to the truth about H even though that event is “typical.”
3. Cisewski et al.’s Version of the Orgulity Argument
As Cisewski et al. (2018) read Belot, assigning probability 0 to a topologically large set
is a sign of epistemological immodesty. An agent with such probabilities is “practically cer-
tain” that a (topologically) typical event will not occur. The main premise of the Orgulity
Argument, on Cisewski et al.’s reading, is that epistemological immodesty in this sense is
rationally forbidden. More precisely, Cisewski et al. claim that the following conditions un-
derwrite the Orgulity Argument.
Topological Condition #1: Do not assign probability 1 to a meager set.
Topological Condition #2: Assign probability 0 to each hypothesis that is a meager
set.7
5Some further examples: the Cantor set is an uncountable set but is nowhere dense, and so meager. Q is
a countable and dense subset of R, but is also meager.
6Belot shows that if a probability is “open-minded” in a technical sense (2013, p. 496), then its failure
set for a hypothesis that is countable and dense is comeager (2013, p. 499). Treating this sense of open-
mindedness will not be essential for our purposes since we can focus directly on the existence of comeager
failure sets.
7Cisewski et al. qualify these conditions to apply only to meager sets of observables. It isn’t entirely clear
what they intend with this qualification. One possibility is that it indicates that the above conditions do not
apply to hypotheses whose truth values are not determined by (even infinitely many) observations. Bayesian
convergence to the truth, at any rate, does not hold for such hypotheses (Huttegger, 2015b, p. 590). (Our
claim in the introduction that coherence compels Bayesians to “always be fully confident” likewise fails for
such hypotheses.) If this is what Cisewski et al. intend, then our omission is harmless since we have restricted
ourselves to the space of observables.
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We will focus on Condition #1, but our criticisms carry over straightforwardly to the “more
demanding” Condition #2.
As pointed out in the previous section, there exist probability spaces pC,B, P q and meager
subsets of C that are assigned P -probability 1. Such a P violates Topological Condition # 1.
The conclusion of the Orgulity Argument, on Cisewski et al.’s reading, is that Bayesianism
should be rejected as a theory of rationality. Cisewski et al. deny the Orgulity Argument’s
conclusion and go on to argue convincingly that the above topological conditions have some
untenable consequences.
Others seem to share Cisewski et al.’s view that the above topological conditions underwrite
the Orgulity Argument. For example, according to Huttegger, Belot’s argument “appears
to be along the lines of ‘if a set is residual in the topology, then it should have positive
probability’” (2015b, p. 594). The injunction that Huttegger attributes to Belot is equivalent
to Topological Condition #1. If residual sets should have positive probability, then their
complements should not have probability 1. And, by definition, the complement of a residual
set is meager. So, Huttegger is attributing to Belot the view that meager sets should not
have probability 1.
Similarly, Weatherson presents the Orgulity Argument as introducing the “requirement”
of modesty for residual sets (2015, p. 532). For Weatherson, a probability P is modest
with respect to a hypothesis H if P assigns positive probability to the failure set for H.8
To say that modesty is required for residual sets, then, is tantamount to an endorsement of
Topological Condition #1. Although neither Weatherson nor Huttegger is as explicit in their
presentation of the Orgulity Argument as Cisewski et al., it is clear that the above topological
conditions underwrite their interpretations of Belot.
We agree with Cisewski et al. that the conclusion of the Orgulity Argument is that
Bayesianism should be rejected. But as we interpret Belot, the above topological conditions
do not in fact occur as premises in the Orgulity Argument. Belot ends his paper with
the following summary: “The truth concerning Bayesian convergence-to-the-truth results
is significantly worse than has been generally allowed—they constitute a real liability for
Bayesianism by forbidding a reasonable epistemological modesty” (2013, emphasis ours). His
indictment of Bayesianism is based on the claim that modest probability judgments, which
ought to be permissible, are deemed impermissible (forbidden) on the Bayesian account.
Cisewski et al. reply instead to a version of the Orgulity Argument according to which such
modesty is mandatory. But the Orgulity Argument need not (and it appears that Belot
does not) mandate modesty to arrive at its conclusion. We develop this alternative way to
construe the Orgulity Argument in Sections 4 and 5.
But it is worth pointing out already that the Cisewski et al. topological conditions are
not even plausible on their face. Consider the probability according to which each digit in
ω is determined by the outcome of a fair coin toss. By the strong law of large numbers, the
hypothesis that the limiting relative frequency of 1s is 1{2 is assigned probability 1. But,
it turns out, this hypothesis is a meager subset of C.9 Topological Condition #1 implies
that this probability measure is rationally impermissible. If one thinks that there are some
contexts in which it is rationally permissible to adopt probabilities represented by the fair
coin measure, then one should reject Topological Condition #1. Whether or not Belot in fact
8We agree with Weatherson that this is the correct way to understand modesty in the context of the
Orgulity Argument (cf. Section 5).
9Belot suggested this example to us in personal communication. For details, see Oxtoby (2013, p. 85).
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endorses the topological conditions that Cisewski et al. attribute to him, a better version of
the Orgulity Argument is available. This form of the argument relies on neither of the above
topological conditions. We turn to this version of the Orgulity Argument now.
4. An Analogy: de Finetti’s Lottery
We understand the Orgulity Argument in analogy to de Finetti’s criticisms of countable
additivity. Since we expect the latter to be familiar to most participants in the orgulity
debate, we find it helpful to point out that the Orgulity Argument has the same structure as
the argument based on de Finetti’s lottery.
So far, we have assumed that all rational probability judgments are countably additive,
but de Finetti denies this. On his view, if we take countable additivity to be a universal
constraint on rational probability judgments, eminently reasonable credal states are ruled out.
De Finetti does not insist that personal probability must always violate countable additivity.
Rather, he insists that violating countable additivity is permissible (at least under certain
circumstances). Insistence on countable additivity is heavy-handedness.
Consider a lottery consisting of countably many tickets, one for each integer. According
to de Finetti, it should be open to a rational agent to consider such a lottery fair (de Finetti,
1990). To do so, each ticket must be assigned equal probability. But if probabilities are
countably additive, this is not possible. If each ticket is assigned the same positive probability,
then the probability of the union of the tickets, being equal to the sum of the probabilities
of the individual tickets, is infinite, and not 1 as the probability axioms demand. If, on the
other hand, each ticket is assigned probability 0, then so is the probability of their union.
Again, this contradicts the probability axioms.
The example is meant to show that countable additivity is heavy-handed as a constraint on
rational probabilities. It forbids an opinion that is reasonable, at least in some circumstances,
namely that a lottery on the integers is fair. If one is willing, as de Finetti is, to relax countable
additivity in response to these considerations, then one can adopt a merely finitely additive
probability that assigns each ticket in the integer lottery probability 0, thus reflecting the
opinion that the lottery is fair.10
There are various ways to counter de Finetti’s argument. One could contest its conclusion—
that violations of countable additivity are permissible—by denying the premise that it is
sometimes reasonable to believe that a lottery on the integers is fair. Or, one could admit that
de Finetti’s argument counts as a consideration against mandating countable additivity but
claim that this consideration is outweighed by arguments that support mandatory countable
additivity. For example, one could appeal to extended Dutch book arguments based on
countable collections of bets or to countable additivity’s theoretical fruitfulness. Rejoinders
to these reservations about de Finetti’s position have been voiced a number of times in the
literature (e.g., Kelly, 1996; Howson, 2014).
Our aim in this section is not to adjudicate debates about the integer lottery. We have
rehearsed de Finetti’s argument in order to show that the best version of the Orgulity Ar-
gument has an analogous structure. As we will explain at greater length in the next section,
according to proponents of the Orgulity Argument, Bayesianism forbids an opinion that is
reasonable, at least in some circumstances, namely, having less than full confidence in con-
verging to the truth. Later in the paper (Section 6), we will push the analogy further when
10For a relatively recent study of uniform distributions on the natural numbers, see (Schirokauer and
Kadane, 2007).
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we turn to evaluating a particular reply to the Orgulity Argument based on finitely additive
probability.
5. A Modest Orgulity Argument
As we have just explained, the inconsistency of countable additivity with a fair lottery
on the integers is taken by some as grounds to reject countable additivity as a requirement
of rationality. Similarly, we suggest, the correct version of the Orgulity Argument sees the
inconsistency of Bayesianism with a “reasonable epistemological modesty” as grounds to
reject Bayesianism. We call this version of the argument modest because it relies on a
premise that is strictly weaker than the topological conditions that appear in Cisewski et
al.’s version.
According to the modest Orgulity Argument, a probability P is modest concerning some
hypothesis H P B if P assigns the failure set for H positive probability. Such modesty
is reasonable if the failure set is comeager (topologically “typical”). “Reasonable” here is
interpreted as it was above for the de Finetti lottery, that is, as synonymous with “permis-
sible” not with “required.” Some agent may adopt a modest opinion regarding H without
thereby surrendering his rationality. In order to accuse Bayesianism of orgulity, it is enough
to think that it should be rationally permissible for an agent to assign positive probability to
a comeager failure set. Such modesty need not be required as Cisewski et al.’s first topolog-
ical condition puts it. The following topological condition underwrites the modest Orgulity
Argument.
Topological Condition #3: It is permissible (in some circumstances) to assign pos-
itive probability to a comeager failure set.
What is desired, on our reading of Belot, is the existence of some probability P on pC,Bq
that assigns a comeager failure set positive probability. Some such P should be rationally
permissible. In other words, for some H, among the rational probability measures for which
the failure set for H is comeager, there should be some P such that
P
`tω : 1Hpωq ‰ lim
nÑ8 P pH|ω
nqu˘ ą 0.
But Bayesianism forbids this, by (1). There is no such probability. So Bayesianism, the
argument concludes, should be rejected.11
On our view, attacks on Topological Conditions #1 and #2 are analogous to attacks
on mandatory violations of countable additivity. They do not bear on the modest Orgulity
Argument, just as attacks on the position that mere finite additivity is mandatory do not bear
on de Finetti’s position as we presented it in the last section. Propounders of the Orgulity
Argument, as we understand them, are pleading for less stringent epistemological demands,
not proposing new ones. We find that this modest version of the Orgulity Argument, even
if ultimately wrong, is more compelling than the version that forbids assigning probability 1
to meager sets. It is the modest Orgulity Argument that should be the focus of the debate.
11Some seem to endorse something akin to our reading of the argument. For example, regarding the
assignment of positive probability to a comeager failure set, Elga asks, “Is such humility rationally permissible?
According to Gordon Belot’s orgulity argument: the answer is yes, but long-run convergence-to-the-truth
theorems force Bayesians to answer no” (2016, p. 305, emphasis ours).
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6. More on Comeager Failure Sets and Finite Additivity
Having identified the best version of the Orgulity argument, we are now in a position to
respond to it. Here, the analogy to de Finetti’s criticism of countable additivity shows itself to
be doubly apt. Just as in the integer lottery case, the epistemic state desired by proponents of
the Orgulity Argument is permissible if countable additivity is relaxed (Elga, 2016; Cisewski
et al., 2018). Elga shows that there exists a merely finitely additive probability measure that
assigns positive probability to a comeager failure set.12 This probability assignment exhibits
the sort of epistemological modesty that Belot thinks is reasonable. While a Bayesianism
that assumes countable additivity is inconsistent with Topological Condition #3, Elga’s reply
shows that finitely additive Bayesianism is not, just as some finitely additive probabilities are
consistent with the judgment that the integer lottery is fair.
It seems the relevance of Elga’s point has been misunderstood along the same lines as
Belot’s original argument has. For example, Pomatto and Sandroni claim that concerns
about Bayesian orgulity extend to merely finitely additive probabilities because some merely
finitely additive probabilities converge to the truth in the context of a certain “hard” kind
of inference problem (2018, p. 15). By our lights, the important point in the context of
Pomatto and Sandroni’s framework is that, unlike countably additive probabilities, not all
merely finitely additive probabilities are fully confident in solving the problem.
Cisewski et al. find Elga’s reply unsatisfactory for similar reasons. They complain that his
example shows modesty about only one event. They write, “Hence, though Elga argues that
P is modest with respect to one limiting frequency hypothesis, according to Condition # 1
P is immodest for a different but related hypothesis about existence of well-defined limiting
frequencies” (Cisewski et al., 2018, p. 61).
In view of our articulation of the modest Orgulity Argument, it is now easy to see that these
criticisms are misguided. Recall that, as we have shown above, Topological Condition #1 does
not occur as a premise in the Orgulity Argument. Rather, the main premise of the Orgulity
Argument is Topological Condition #3. With this point firmly in mind it is clear that a reply
to the Orgulity Argument based on relaxing countable additivity is legitimate. Since it can
be shown that there exist merely finitely additive probabilities that assign positive measure
to some comeager failure set, it follows that finitely additive Bayesianism is consistent with
Topological Condition #3. This should go some way towards answering Belot’s intended
challenge.
While we do not find their criticisms of Elga compelling, Cisewski et al.’s remarks do raise
the possibility of strengthening the Orgulity Argument’s main premise. A premise interme-
diate to Belot’s and Cisewski et al.’s asks that modesty concerning every comeager failure
set be permissible under some circumstances. Although not explicitly endorsed by Belot, we
find the following condition worthy of further investigation.
Topological Condition #4: It is permissible (in some circumstances) to assign pos-
itive probability to every comeager failure set.
Topological Condition #4 is clearly stronger than Topological Condition #3, but it is weaker
than Topological Condition #1 on two counts. First, in keeping with the main theme of this
12Cisewski et al. dispute the mathematical details of the particular example Elga offers, arguing that his
proofs involve conditioning on null events. They then offer a slightly modified example, which they claim
achieves what Elga intends. But even if a merely finitely additive probability assigns positive probability to
some comeager failure set, it may assign probability 0 to some other comeager set.
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paper, it claims that certain probability assignments are permissible. It does not mandate any
particular assignments. Second, Topological Condition #4 applies only to comeager failure
sets, not to every comeager set. Only the former are relevant to the Orgulity Argument.
Cisewski et al.’s criticism raises the question, Can Elga’s reply be extended by showing
that finitely additive Bayesianism is consistent with Topological Condition #4? In fact it
can be, as we show with the following proposition.
Proposition 1. There exist uncountably many finitely additive probabilities that assign pos-
itive probability to all their comeager failure sets.
Proof. To see that the proposition holds, note that the collection of comeager subsets of C
forms a filter on the powerset of C. That is, the collection of comeager sets contains C and
is closed under supersets and finite intersections. The filter of comeager subsets of C can be
extended to an ultrafilter U , a filter that contains exactly one of A or Ac for every A Ď C.
The set function U defined on the powerset of C by UpAq “ 1 if A P U and UpAq “ 0 if
A R U is a finitely additive probability measure that assigns probability 1 to every comeager
subset of C. Hence, the restriction of U to the Borel sigma-algebra B, which we will also
denote by U , is a finitely additive probability measure that assigns probability 1 to every
comeager, Borel-measurable subset of C. A fortiori, U assigns positive probability to all of
its comeager failure sets. This establishes that U satisfies Topological Condition #4. To see
that there are uncountably many other such finitely additive probabilities, fix λ P p0, 1q and
observe that the function P ÞÑ λP ` p1 ´ λqU injects the space of probability measures on
pC,Bq into the space of probability measures that satisfy Topological Condition #4. This
proves the proposition.
We remark that the argument just given actually establishes the following result. For
any topological space X, and any measurable space pX,Fq, let P be the collection of finitely
additive probabilities P on pX,Fq satisfying: P pAq ą 0 for every measurable, comeager subset
of X. Then the cardinality of P is equal to the cardinality of the space of all probabilities on
pX,Fq. 
Although the argument just given shows that finitely additive Bayesianism is consistent
with Topological Condition #4, there is an objection to consider. One might regard the
probabilities constructed above as mere mathematical curiosities. It’s not clear that they bear
any resemblance to the more familiar probability constructions that Belot uses to advance
his argument. In addition to answering this objection, the next proposition, as we will see,
also improves on Proposition 1. To begin, we must first recall how probabilities are typically
constructed in the countably additive setting. The standard approach is to first define P on a
collection of “simple” or “low-complexity” subsets. One then appeals to an extension theorem
to establish that P extends to the entire sigma-algebra generated by the simple subsets. In
our setting, the simple subsets are all those of the form ωn, as well as finite unions of these
sets. This collection forms an algebra, which we denote by F , and F generates B. For
example, to construct the fair coin measure that was mentioned before, one first defines P
by P pωnq “ 2´n and then shows that P is countably additive on F . By the Carathe´dory
extension theorem, P extends to a unique countably additive probability whose domain is all
of B.
This is how more or less every familiar and interesting countably additive measure on
pC,Bq is constructed.13 The next result shows that any P defined on F can be extended to
13There are ways to define P directly, without appeal to extension theorems, for example, by letting P be
point mass concentrated on some ω P C.
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a finitely additive probability that is consistent with Topological Condition #4. This means
that for every countably additive probability, there exists a finitely additive probability that
“resembles” it in the sense that the two agree on F , and the finitely additive probability is
modest in the strong sense of condition #4.
Proposition 2. Let P be a finitely additive probability with domain F . Let G be any algebra
containing F . There exists an extension P 1 of P to G such that P 1pCq “ 1 for every comeager
subset C of C in G.14
Proof. The proof follows closely the proof of Theorem 4 in Pomatto et al. (2014). Let M be
the collection of meager subsets of C, and let
A “  pF X Cq YM : F P F , Cc PMX G,M PMX G(.
Observe that F Ď A Ď G. One can now verify that A is an algebra, and that the function
P 1 defined on A by
P 1ppF X Cq YMq “ P pF q
is a well-defined, finitely additive probability measure (see the reference above for details).
By construction, with F “ H, P 1pMq “ 0 for every meager subset M in G. With a harmless
abuse of notation, P 1 now extends to G, and the result is proved. 
Our propositions show that replies to the Orgulity Argument based on finitely additive
probability are robust. By relaxing countable additivity, various notions of modesty akin to
the one in which Belot is interested are easily accommodated.15
As with de Finetti’s lottery argument, there are responses to the Orgulity Argument besides
relaxing countable additivity. One could deny the basic assumption that topology is of any
relevance to epistemology, for example (Huttegger, 2015b).16 In fact, we are quite sympathetic
to this line of response. In order for the Orgulity Argument to be truly convincing, an
explanation of when and why confidence should coincide with topological typicality is needed.
An effort to fill this gap would be an interesting line of research. However, as a reply to the
Orgulity Argument, appealing to finitely additive probabilities has the rhetorical advantage
of allowing us to grant both the general relevance of topology to epistemology and the various
specific topological conditions for the sake of the argument. Even with these assumptions
granted for the sake of the argument, finitely additive Bayesianism need not be abandoned.
Alternatively, one may find the assumptions of the Orgulity Argument plausible or genuinely
compelling. In that case, Elga’s point and our propositions contribute to the case against
mandating countable additivity.
7. Conclusion
The modest Orgulity Argument takes as a premise that it is permissible, at least sometimes,
to assign probability greater than 0 to a comeager failure set. It does not appeal to a universal
injunction against assigning probability 1 to meager sets a` la Topological Condition #1. To
do so would be analogous to claiming that countably additive probabilities are rationally
forbidden. We hope that future contributors to the debate focus their efforts on the modest
version of the Orgulity Argument that we have articulated here.
14Thanks to Belot for pointing out in conversation that Proposition 2 strengthens Proposition 1.
15For what it’s worth, one can glean from the above arguments that even Cisewski et al.’s demanding
conditions are satisfiable by moving to finitely additive probabilities.
16Pollard observes, “Many probabilists seem to regard topology as completely extraneous to any discussion
of conditioning, or even to any discussion of abstract probability theory” (2002, p. 117).
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Following Elga, we have also defended a reply to the modest Orgulity Argument that ap-
peals to finitely additive probability. We have argued that this reply is robust by considering
topological conditions that are stronger than those that Belot appeals to but weaker and more
plausible than those of Cisewski et al. In particular, Topological Condition #4 claims that
it is permissible in some circumstances to assign positive probability to all comeager failure
sets. We have shown that finitely additive probabilities can meet the even more demanding
challenges raised by this new condition. There are uncountably many finitely additive proba-
bilities on pC,Bq that assign positive probability to all their comeager failure sets. Just as in
de Finetti’s lottery, finitely additive probability permits agents to adopt seemingly reasonable
states of probability judgment that are ruled out by countable additivity.
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